Straight answers, sources attached

No. It was signed on 27 April 2026 but takes effect only after both countries complete ratification. In New Zealand that requires the India Free Trade Agreement Legislation Amendment Bill to pass Parliament; the bill passed first reading on 25 June 2026 and is before the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, with public submissions closing 19 July 2026. The Government aims to ratify later in 2026.

Partly. The 5,000 cap ("at any one time", roughly 1,667 grants a year on three-year terms) applies to one pathway: the Temporary Employment Entry scheme for listed skilled occupations plus 600 "iconic Indian occupation" visas (Appendix 8L-1).

Other pathways in the treaty have no numerical limit: intra-corporate transferees and specialists (Annex 8K, Section B), students at recognised institutions — where numerical limits are expressly prohibited (Annex 8F(2)) — and the partners and dependent children of anyone granted more than 12 months' stay (Annex 8K, Section F). All still require standard visa eligibility (health, character, funds, and for ICTs an employing company with a presence in NZ).

Not for the treaty's annex categories, without breaching it. Article 8C.3(4) says neither country shall "adopt or maintain any limitations on the total number" of people in the committed categories, nor "require an economic needs test, including a labour market test… except as provided for in Annex 8J or Annex 8K". So the caps that exist (the 5,000 TEE scheme) are preserved, and the categories without caps (ICTs, students, dependants) can't have caps added later.

New Zealand keeps full control of everything outside those categories — general work visas, residence policy, skilled migrant settings — and the committee's report leaned on that flexibility. Critics respond that carving specific categories out of democratic control is precisely their objection. Note a treaty breach isn't automatically "illegal" domestically — Parliament remains sovereign — but it would expose NZ to state-to-state dispute proceedings and retaliation.

Yes. Annex 8K Section F obliges New Zealand to allow entry and stay of the partner (married, civil union, de facto or same-sex) and dependent children under 20 of anyone granted more than 12 months' stay under the annex, for the same duration as the primary visa. Before the text was released some ministers publicly downplayed or denied this; the text is unambiguous. Whether accompanying-family rights are ordinary practice (they are common in NZ visa policy) or a significant multiplier on uncapped pathways is where the sides part ways.

Not through the treaty. Annex 8L states nothing in it applies to "citizenship, nationality, residence or employment on a permanent basis", and the TEE visas carry three-year stand-downs. Temporary visa holders can still apply for residence under New Zealand's own domestic categories, exactly as any other temporary migrant can — those settings remain under NZ control and can be changed at any time. Critics argue the combination of treaty-guaranteed entry plus domestic residence pathways functions as a pipeline; supporters note the pipeline's tap (residence policy) stays firmly in NZ hands.

Legally, yes — practically, it depends on compliance. The FTA changes no tax law: Article 18.3 carves all direct taxation out of the agreement, and the 1986 NZ–India double tax agreement governs. Under its employment-income article, once someone works in NZ beyond 183 days, New Zealand can tax their full remuneration for work performed here — regardless of where the salary is paid or how much of it is remitted to NZ.

The practical wrinkle: Annex 8K requires intra-corporate transferees' salaries to be "paid entirely by" the employing (Indian) company. With no NZ employer running PAYE, collection relies on the worker self-reporting (the IR56 regime), IRD cross-checks (immigration data, bank reporting), and treaty information-exchange with India. Overseas experience with foreign-payroll secondments shows real leakage risk. Also note temporary entrants are exempted from directly funded social-security contributions — and correspondingly barred from claiming those benefits (Article 8C.3(5)).

Mostly no. India kept its dairy market closed — a red line it has held in every negotiation, including its UK and Australia deals. Exceptions: tariffs on bulk infant formula and certain dairy-based preparations phase to zero over seven years, and milk-protein albumin tariffs halve within a quota. There's a duty-free "fast-track" for NZ dairy ingredients used in Indian manufacturing strictly for re-export, and a consultation clause if India ever grants dairy access to a comparable economy. Supporters call the exclusion inevitable and the toeholds valuable; critics say a deal that excludes NZ's biggest export while giving India full access is misdescribed as "comprehensive".

The obligation is to promote investment — but it has teeth. Article 9.2 commits NZ to promote FDI into India "with the aim to increase such investment by US Dollars 20 billion within 15 years" (about NZ$33–34b). The government can't order private firms to invest, and the treaty acknowledges this by making the remedy process long: scheduled reviews at years 5, 10 and 15, adjustment for shocks like pandemics or crises, consultations, and a possible three-year grace period.

But if the aim is unmet and consultations fail, Article 9.10 lets India — "notwithstanding any other provision under this Agreement" — take proportionate, temporary "remedial measures to rebalance the concessions", i.e. re-impose some tariffs on NZ exports. Article 9.11 excludes the chapter from dispute settlement, so NZ couldn't formally challenge that. Supporters stress the remedy is bounded (worst case ≈ back towards the pre-FTA tariff position, years from now); critics stress the target's sheer scale — comparable to NZ's total accumulated outward FDI worldwide — makes shortfall likely and hands India lasting leverage. Both readings of the text are accurate; see the debate.

Tariff-rate quotas: the first preferential apple access India has given anyone, a tariff-free kiwifruit quota with 50% cuts beyond it, and 75% honey tariff cuts over five years. The catch is Annex 2B: the quotas are "subject to New Zealand's actions to fulfil its obligations under the respective action plans" — five-year programmes assisting India's own apple, kiwifruit and honey industries (variety and planting-material exchange, commercialising premium NZ cultivars in India, kiwifruit centres of excellence). If India considers NZ hasn't delivered, and a four-step consultation ladder fails, it may suspend the market access until NZ complies. Industry bodies negotiated alongside the Crown and support the deal; the sharpest critique is that the technology transfer is permanent while the access is conditional. See the debate, and our background briefing on who owns the varieties, who paid to breed them, and whether the IP can be protected in India.

It commits to cooperation on one — the words are worth reading exactly. Annex 8A.14(j) has both countries "engage in an in-depth study, design and implementation of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in both retail and cross-border payments area". It sits in a fintech cooperation list, creates no timetable, and doesn't oblige anyone to use a digital currency; the Reserve Bank has been studying digital cash for years regardless. Critics' point is that "design and implementation" — not merely "study" — of a retail CBDC is a policy commitment with civil-liberties implications that arrived in a trade annex without debate. Supporters' point is that cooperation clauses of this kind don't bind Parliament to issue anything. Both are fair characterisations of a genuinely odd clause to find in an FTA.

Article 13.2 has both parties, "subject to their respective reservations", affirm a list of international instruments including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples "and their respective positions made on that Declaration" — wording that preserves NZ's 2010 qualified support and India's own qualifying statement (which India additionally footnoted). The agreement elsewhere carries NZ's standard Treaty of Waitangi exception, preserving the Crown's ability to meet Treaty obligations. Critics note "affirm" is stronger than the "note/recall" language in NZ's UK and EU FTAs and see incremental entrenchment; supporters note affirmation of an instrument NZ adopted 16 years ago changes no domestic law. The clause has no trade-sanction enforcement.

The independent Motu assessment projects GDP about 0.07% (~$401m/yr) higher by 2036 than without the FTA, reaching ~0.1% by 2050, with real wages up ~0.07% — driven mostly by tariff cuts. Set against that: ~$15m/yr foregone NZ tariff revenue, and the model's stated limits — it holds labour supply constant (no migration effects), and doesn't model the action plans, the investment clause, or displacement from technology transfer. Supporters add unmodelled strategic upside (diversification, first-mover position in a fast-growing market); critics add the unmodelled costs and note much early gain is trade diverted from other markets. The honest answer: modest, positive, and more uncertain in both directions than the headline suggests.

Confidential negotiation is standard practice for trade agreements under governments of all stripes — positions on tariff lines can't be tabled publicly without destroying them. What's contested is the sequencing afterwards: the text was released only after signature, and after Labour's support had already guaranteed ratification numbers, which critics say made subsequent scrutiny symbolic. The counterpoint: Parliament's treaty examination drew 1,780 submissions, the committee published findings, and a second submission round on the bill is open now. Whether NZ's executive-led treaty process needs structural reform is a live question that this deal has sharpened — see the debate.

The treaty can't be ratified and doesn't enter into force — signature alone creates no tariff cuts or visa obligations. In practice the bill's passage is very likely: National, ACT and Labour support it, a clear majority even with New Zealand First opposed. A signed-but-unratified treaty does carry a soft international obligation not to defeat its object and purpose, and walking away would have real diplomatic costs with India — one reason critics wanted scrutiny before signature.

No — and this matters for what submissions can achieve. The committee can amend the enabling bill (quota administration, levies, thresholds) and can recommend anything — including that the Government seek side letters, delay ratification, or commission further analysis — but the treaty text itself is fixed unless both governments renegotiate. Submissions arguing about the treaty are still worthwhile: they build the public record, inform the committee's report, and shape how implementing regulations and future reviews are handled.

New Zealand First opposes the FTA from inside the coalition under an "agree to disagree" arrangement — its ministers voted against the bill at first reading. In late June 2026, Foreign Minister Peters went further, alleging the Government was preparing immigration-policy changes that would apply restrictions (labour-market tests, in-country application limits, family-visa limits, residence-eligibility exclusions) specifically to Indian nationals alongside the FTA — which he called discriminatory and damaging to the relationship. The Government rejects the characterisation. The episode illustrates the deal's odd politics: it is simultaneously attacked for admitting too many people and for treating those it admits too restrictively.

Submissions on the bill are published by the select committee on the Parliament website as the committee processes them (submitters can request confidentiality). The 1,780 submissions from the earlier treaty examination are published under that examination's page. We link to both, and will mirror key public submissions here as they're released — see Have your say.