Straight answers, sources attached

Not yet — but the last big step in New Zealand is done. The treaty was signed on 27 April 2026 and takes effect only after both countries complete ratification. Parliament passed the enabling legislation on 16 September 2026, 93 votes to 29, after taking the second reading, committee stage and third reading under urgency across 15–16 September. The bills now await Royal Assent, after which the Government notifies India that New Zealand's procedures are complete. India's side is an executive act with no parliamentary vote; its commerce secretary expects the agreement to be "operationalised in the latter half of October 2026", and an official has cited 19 October. Under Article 20 the treaty enters into force 30 days after the two notifications are exchanged, or on another agreed date — so treat October as an expectation until both governments announce it.

Tariffs on about 57% of New Zealand's current exports to India go to zero immediately (sheep meat, wool, coal, most forestry), with the rest phasing down over up to seven years to reach 95% coverage; India's exports enter New Zealand duty-free from day one. The apple, kiwifruit and mānuka honey quotas open, pro-rated for whatever is left of the year thanks to a select committee amendment. The Overseas Investment Act threshold for Indian investors rises to $200 million. The temporary-entry commitments switch on, but Indian applicants can't use them until Immigration New Zealand publishes the specific visa instructions — anyone planning around them should wait for those rather than the political debate. The US$20 billion investment-promotion clock and the treaty's review mechanisms also start from that date.

Partly. The 5,000 cap ("at any one time", roughly 1,667 grants a year on three-year terms) applies to one pathway: the Temporary Employment Entry scheme for listed skilled occupations plus 600 "iconic Indian occupation" visas (Appendix 8L-1).

Other pathways in the treaty have no numerical limit: intra-corporate transferees and specialists (Annex 8K, Section B), students at recognised institutions — where numerical limits are expressly prohibited (Annex 8F(2)) — and the partners and dependent children of anyone granted more than 12 months' stay (Annex 8K, Section F). All still require standard visa eligibility (health, character, funds, and for ICTs an employing company with a presence in NZ).

Not for the treaty's annex categories, without breaching it. Article 8C.3(4) says neither country shall "adopt or maintain any limitations on the total number" of people in the committed categories, nor "require an economic needs test, including a labour market test… except as provided for in Annex 8J or Annex 8K". So the caps that exist (the 5,000 TEE scheme) are preserved, and the categories without caps (ICTs, students, dependants) can't have caps added later.

New Zealand keeps full control of everything outside those categories — general work visas, residence policy, skilled migrant settings — and the committee's report leaned on that flexibility. Critics respond that carving specific categories out of democratic control is precisely their objection. Note a treaty breach isn't automatically "illegal" domestically — Parliament remains sovereign — but it would expose NZ to state-to-state dispute proceedings and retaliation.

Yes. Annex 8K Section F obliges New Zealand to allow entry and stay of the partner (married, civil union, de facto or same-sex) and dependent children under 20 of anyone granted more than 12 months' stay under the annex, for the same duration as the primary visa. Before the text was released some ministers publicly downplayed or denied this; the text is unambiguous. Whether accompanying-family rights are ordinary practice (they are common in NZ visa policy) or a significant multiplier on uncapped pathways is where the sides part ways.

Not through the treaty. Annex 8L states nothing in it applies to "citizenship, nationality, residence or employment on a permanent basis", and the TEE visas carry three-year stand-downs. Temporary visa holders can still apply for residence under New Zealand's own domestic categories, exactly as any other temporary migrant can — those settings remain under NZ control and can be changed at any time. Critics argue the combination of treaty-guaranteed entry plus domestic residence pathways functions as a pipeline; supporters note the pipeline's tap (residence policy) stays firmly in NZ hands.

Legally, yes — practically, it depends on compliance. The FTA changes no tax law: Article 18.3 carves all direct taxation out of the agreement, and the 1986 NZ–India double tax agreement governs. Under its employment-income article, once someone works in NZ beyond 183 days, New Zealand can tax their full remuneration for work performed here — regardless of where the salary is paid or how much of it is remitted to NZ.

The practical wrinkle: Annex 8K requires intra-corporate transferees' salaries to be "paid entirely by" the employing (Indian) company. With no NZ employer running PAYE, collection relies on the worker self-reporting (the IR56 regime), IRD cross-checks (immigration data, bank reporting), and treaty information-exchange with India. Overseas experience with foreign-payroll secondments shows real leakage risk. Also note temporary entrants are exempted from directly funded social-security contributions — and correspondingly barred from claiming those benefits (Article 8C.3(5)).

Mostly no. India kept its dairy market closed — a red line it has held in every negotiation, including its UK and Australia deals. Exceptions: tariffs on bulk infant formula and certain dairy-based preparations phase to zero over seven years, and milk-protein albumin tariffs halve within a quota. There's a duty-free "fast-track" for NZ dairy ingredients used in Indian manufacturing strictly for re-export, and a consultation clause if India ever grants dairy access to a comparable economy. Supporters call the exclusion inevitable and the toeholds valuable; critics say a deal that excludes NZ's biggest export while giving India full access is misdescribed as "comprehensive".

The obligation is to promote investment — but it has teeth. Article 9.2 commits NZ to promote FDI into India "with the aim to increase such investment by US Dollars 20 billion within 15 years" (about NZ$33–34b). The government can't order private firms to invest, and the treaty acknowledges this by making the remedy process long: scheduled reviews at years 5, 10 and 15, adjustment for shocks like pandemics or crises, consultations, and a possible three-year grace period.

But if the aim is unmet and consultations fail, Article 9.10 lets India — "notwithstanding any other provision under this Agreement" — take proportionate, temporary "remedial measures to rebalance the concessions", i.e. re-impose some tariffs on NZ exports. Article 9.11 excludes the chapter from dispute settlement, so NZ couldn't formally challenge that. Supporters stress the remedy is bounded (worst case ≈ back towards the pre-FTA tariff position, years from now); critics stress the target's sheer scale — comparable to NZ's total accumulated outward FDI worldwide — makes shortfall likely and hands India lasting leverage. Both readings of the text are accurate; see the debate.

Tariff-rate quotas: the first preferential apple access India has given anyone, a tariff-free kiwifruit quota with 50% cuts beyond it, and 75% honey tariff cuts over five years. The catch is Annex 2B: the quotas are "subject to New Zealand's actions to fulfil its obligations under the respective action plans" — five-year programmes assisting India's own apple, kiwifruit and honey industries (variety and planting-material exchange, commercialising premium NZ cultivars in India, kiwifruit centres of excellence). If India considers NZ hasn't delivered, and a four-step consultation ladder fails, it may suspend the market access until NZ complies. Industry bodies negotiated alongside the Crown and support the deal; the sharpest critique is that the technology transfer is permanent while the access is conditional. See the debate, and our background briefing on who owns the varieties, who paid to breed them, and whether the IP can be protected in India.

It commits to cooperation on one — the words are worth reading exactly. Annex 8A.14(j) has both countries "engage in an in-depth study, design and implementation of central bank digital currency (CBDC) in both retail and cross-border payments area". It sits in a fintech cooperation list, creates no timetable, and doesn't oblige anyone to use a digital currency; the Reserve Bank has been studying digital cash for years regardless. Critics' point is that "design and implementation" — not merely "study" — of a retail CBDC is a policy commitment with civil-liberties implications that arrived in a trade annex without debate. Supporters' point is that cooperation clauses of this kind don't bind Parliament to issue anything. Both are fair characterisations of a genuinely odd clause to find in an FTA.

Article 13.2 has both parties, "subject to their respective reservations", affirm a list of international instruments including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples "and their respective positions made on that Declaration" — wording that preserves NZ's 2010 qualified support and India's own qualifying statement (which India additionally footnoted). The agreement elsewhere carries NZ's standard Treaty of Waitangi exception, preserving the Crown's ability to meet Treaty obligations. Critics note "affirm" is stronger than the "note/recall" language in NZ's UK and EU FTAs and see incremental entrenchment; supporters note affirmation of an instrument NZ adopted 16 years ago changes no domestic law. The clause has no trade-sanction enforcement.

The independent Motu assessment projects GDP about 0.07% (~$401m/yr) higher by 2036 than without the FTA, reaching ~0.1% by 2050, with real wages up ~0.07% — driven mostly by tariff cuts. Set against that: ~$15m/yr foregone NZ tariff revenue, and the model's stated limits — it holds labour supply constant (no migration effects), and doesn't model the action plans, the investment clause, or displacement from technology transfer. Supporters add unmodelled strategic upside (diversification, first-mover position in a fast-growing market); critics add the unmodelled costs and note much early gain is trade diverted from other markets. The honest answer: modest, positive, and more uncertain in both directions than the headline suggests.

Confidential negotiation is standard practice for trade agreements under governments of all stripes — positions on tariff lines can't be tabled publicly without destroying them. What's contested is the sequencing afterwards: the text was released only after signature, and after Labour's support had already guaranteed ratification numbers, which critics say made subsequent scrutiny symbolic. The counterpoint: Parliament's treaty examination drew 1,780 submissions, the committee published findings, and a second submission round on the bill drew 149 more. Whether NZ's executive-led treaty process needs structural reform is a live question that this deal has sharpened — see the debate.

Realistically, no. The votes were never in doubt: National, ACT and Labour carried the bill 93–29 at every reading, and the remaining steps — Royal Assent and an exchange of diplomatic notes — are executive acts, not votes. Parliament rises on 24 September for the 7 November election, and the Government can ratify during the campaign. Once the treaty is in force, leaving it requires the withdrawal notice in its final provisions and would carry real diplomatic costs with India. A future government could change domestic settings the treaty doesn't bind (most immigration policy, for instance) but not the tariff, quota, investment or temporary-entry commitments themselves without India's agreement — which is why critics wanted scrutiny before signature, and why supporters call the outcome a settled, bipartisan mandate.

The bill, not the treaty — and only its machinery. The committee could amend the enabling bill and recommend anything, but the treaty text was fixed at signature. Its 10 September report recommended passage by majority, with every amendment agreed unanimously and no minority view filed. The changes: pro-rata quota allocation if the deal starts part-way through a year; use-it-or-lose-it rules so hoarded quota is reallocated; a 15-working-day limit for reviewing export-certificate decisions; public notification of allocation results; the Ministry for Primary Industries held to the same conflict-of-interest and record-keeping rules as private quota managers; a ministerial power to order audits; and search powers rewritten to sit inside the Search and Surveillance Act, with warrantless searches rejected. Submitters can fairly claim most of those. What the report does not contain is any recommendation on supplementary economic modelling, the foreign-payroll tax question, the UNDRIP affirmation or delaying ratification — the bigger asks heard at the hearings. The commentary and amended bill are on the documents page.

New Zealand First opposes the FTA from inside the coalition under an "agree to disagree" arrangement — its ministers voted against the bill at first reading. In late June 2026, Foreign Minister Peters went further, alleging the Government was preparing immigration-policy changes that would apply restrictions (labour-market tests, in-country application limits, family-visa limits, residence-eligibility exclusions) specifically to Indian nationals alongside the FTA — which he called discriminatory and damaging to the relationship. The Government rejects the characterisation. At the final debates in September, New Zealand First voted against the bill at every stage and filibustered the committee stage — unusual conduct for a governing party — with David Wilson citing "uncapped and open-ended migration pathways"; Labour's Priyanca Radhakrishnan accused the party of scaremongering that had "harmed Kiwi-Indian communities". The episode illustrates the deal's odd politics: it is simultaneously attacked for admitting too many people and for treating those it admits too restrictively.

For reasons that differ from New Zealand First's, as the Greens took pains to say. Green MP Steve Abel told the House his party would criticise the deal "on economic grounds" and would not "make a xenophobic attack on it". The Greens' objections centre on Article 9.2 — the obligation to promote US$20 billion of NZ investment into India within 15 years — and on the effect of New Zealand dairy on India's roughly 80 million smallholder dairy farmers, most of whom own one to three cows. In its dissenting note to the earlier treaty examination the party also warned that "politicking of the deal" was fuelling attacks on Indian communities. Te Pāti Māori voted against at every stage; it did not publish a detailed statement on the final vote, and its earlier concerns have focused on the adequacy of Treaty of Waitangi protections and on economic sovereignty. Supporters answer that Article 9.2 is an "effort clause" (Labour's Vanushi Walters) and that India excluded its sensitive dairy lines precisely to protect those farmers — see the investment debate.

Not for the agreement's legal path. The House rises on 24 September, Parliament is dissolved on 1 October and the general election is on 7 November. Ratification is an executive act, so the Government can exchange notes with India during the campaign, and India's signalled October start would fall before election day. What the election decides is who administers the deal afterwards: the quota regulations, the immigration instructions for the FTA pathways, and the investment-promotion effort are all in the hands of whoever forms the next government. Every party has a stated position — National, ACT and Labour voted for the bill; New Zealand First, the Greens and Te Pāti Māori against — which makes the deal a rare election issue where the record is already on Hansard.

The 149 submissions on the bill are published on the Parliament bills site (submitters could request confidentiality), and the 1,780 from the earlier treaty examination under that examination's page. We link to both and mirror a selection on the documents page — see also what the submissions achieved.